Observer takes issue with my fee-for-service arguments from earlier in the week. I am pleased at the interest and the tenacity, but once again feel that my point is somehow not penetrating. So at the risk of boring an audience that is not micro-economically inclined, let's look at Observer's objections one by one.
First, recall what "market failure" means. It doesn't mean that there is no functioning market, that there is no exchange of goods or services. Rather, it means that the market has failed to provide the optimum amount of good or service at the optimum price. In a public goods situation, because of free riders, negative externalities, and other problems, the market tends to underproduce the good or, conversely, overcharge for the good. So in the example at hand, I disagree with Observer that the neighbors are paying a fair price for their service. They are actually paying a higher price than a perfect market would produce because they are paying for the actions of Mr Rueda. To use the jargon, Mr Rueda's external costs have been internalized in the higher fees that the dues-payers pay.
My argument here would break down if Mr Rueda's house were miles from anywhere. But since the fire department has to respond to a fire at his house even though he is not a paying customer, a market failure occurs.
Second, purchasing fire protection is not like buying a toaster. There are 24,500 fire protection districts in the United States. How many are fee-for-service? In my (admittedly brief) search, I could find two, the one in the article and one in Brount County, TN. But for the sake of argument, let's assume that there are 245. That's 1% of the total. And since fee-for-service districts will almost invariably be in rural areas, in aggregate, they probably only service, say, 0.25% of the population. In other words, for the newcomer arriving in a fee-for-service district, there is a 99.75% chance that his last fire protection was publicly provided. I don't think it is unreasonable for someone to therefore assume that his new district will be the same. How would he know differently? How would he know to investigate? My point is that public provision of fire protection is so overwhelmingly the norm that a deviation like the one here represents an information asymmetry.
To use a rather extreme example, imagine moving to a town where you had to pay for the amount of oxygen you consumed. ( This may seem laughable now, but after the passage of the 1927 Radio Act, which created federal regulation of the electromagnetic spectrum, there was widespread concern that the logical next step was regulation of the "very air we breath.") I think you would be surprised, then, if someone slapped a rubber mask over your face because you had failed to pay, in advance, your oxygen dues. Mr Rueda must have been similarly surprised when the fire department showed up at his fire but refused to fight it because he hadn't paid the fee. I think that certainly represents an imbalance of information.
Third, with regard to the per-household cost, Observer makes a good point about rural residents subsidizing urban residents, which is exactly what would happen if the fire district were organized to include both regions and average-cost pricing were used. If marginal-cost pricing were used (which is often used for water and sewer service), however, I don't think Observer's point would be valid.
But I do have to disagree with the point about residents being free to choose a different fire district. Fire protection displays all the features of a natural monopoly: high capital costs and therefore high barriers to entry. There would realistically be no other competing districts. This is why in situations where private companies do provide fire protection, such as by the company Rural/Metro, the service is never provided in a competitive market but under contract to the local government--the private company is essentially filling the role of the local government. (Granted, there is competition in the tendering process, but this so-called privatization is rich fodder for another discussion).
Finally, I have to also disagree with the comparison of mandatory car insurance to taxes. Sure, you can pay less for car insurance if you opt for less service. But you can avoid paying the gas tax if you drive less, and the sales tax if you buy less, and the income tax if you earn less even though they are all still taxes. In our case here, if a resident is required to pay a membership fee to receive fire protection, I don't see how it differs from having to pay a mandatory tax. Is a homeowner association fee, which is mandatory if you live in a house covered by the association, the same as a tax? I would say yes. I think the mandatory fire fee would be the same.
Maybe Observer knows more about the situation then I do. I only read one newspaper article about it. And we can quibble about exactly which market failures are at play here. But I think my underlying point still holds (which maybe I haven't yet made adequately clear), that governments exist for a reason, and I think the Grover Norquist starve-the-beast crowd need to always keep that in mind.